When Less is More: Behavioral Effects of CBDC Holding Limits (ECB)
The European Central Bank (ECB) published a working paper that examines how holding limits affect demand for retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). In an incentivized experiment involving 761 participants in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the authors distinguish the mechanical effects of limits from behavioral responses. Lower limits reduced overall holdings, whereas higher limits induced some participants to increase balances, apparently because the ceiling acted as a reference point. The experiment also found that a “reverse waterfall” mechanism, which automatically funds CBDC payments from linked bank deposits, increased adoption while reducing average holdings. The findings suggest that combining limits with automatic funding could reconcile usability and financial stability objectives in the ECB’s digital euro design. [ECB]
Composable Clearing: How Blockchain Reconciles Efficiency and Safety in Intermediated Markets (JFMI)
In a Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures (JFMI) article, Nicolas Zhang shows how blockchain could reconcile pricing efficiency with settlement safety in intermediated markets. He argues that pooled pricing mechanisms cannot fully reflect private trading information, while uncleared over-the-counter (OTC) markets offer flexible pricing but are vulnerable to coordination failures. Central counterparties (CCPs) can strengthen settlement safety, but do not, by themselves, resolve the pricing problem. His “composable” framework separates price discovery from prefunded clearing, linking them through an atomic settlement map, to ensure that all transaction legs settle together or none do, with multilateral netting reducing collateral requirements. Zhang emphasizes that blockchain facilitates this architecture rather than changing the underlying economics of clearing. He also challenges the proposition that settlement finality necessarily requires central bank money, arguing that suitably secured tokenized Treasury bills could serve as alternative settlement assets. Applications include Treasury repurchase agreements and less-liquid foreign-exchange markets. [JFMI]
BTW if you want to see a complete database of my DFC-related posts going back years, including many that didn’t make the Daily Digest cut, click here.
FYI I produce a monthly digest of digital fiat currency (DFC) developments exclusively for the official sector (e.g., central banks, ministries of finance and international financial institution (e.g., the BIS, IMF, OECD, World Bank)) plus academics and firms that are active in the DFC space (commercial banks, technology providers, consultants, etc.). (DFCs include central bank digital currency (CBDC), stablecoins and tokenized deposits.) It goes out via email on the first business day of every month, and if you’re interested in being on the mailing list, please email me at john@kiffmeister.com.










