I’m continuing my backfilling, this time catching up to some papers that were published in January that I put on the back burner because January was one of *those* months:
The Hidden Plumbing of Stablecoins: Financial and Technological Risks in the GENIUS Act Era (MIT DCI)
The MIT Digital Currency Initiative (DCI) published a paper evaluates the financial, technological, and regulatory risks facing U.S. dollar stablecoins under the 2025 GENIUS Act. The authors argue that while the Act strengthens reserve asset quality and transparency, it treats stablecoin stability primarily as a balance-sheet problem, leaving critical vulnerabilities unaddressed. Maintaining par-value redemption depends not only on high-quality backing assets but also on the functioning of Treasury and repo markets, broker-dealer balance-sheet capacity, and blockchain operational reliability. The paper identifies three interconnected risk layers: financial risks (including Treasury market fragility and dealer intermediation bottlenecks), technological risks (smart contract bugs, consensus attacks, bridge failures), and regulatory gaps (undefined redemption mechanics, lack of capital requirements, no access to Federal Reserve liquidity facilities). The analysis reveals that even conservatively backed stablecoins could face stress from redemption surges or market disruptions, and that stablecoin issuers have significantly lower capital buffers than commercial banks. The authors conclude that durable stability requires an integrated approach spanning financial-market infrastructure, prudential regulation, and software governance, while highlighting a key policy dilemma: granting stablecoin issuers Fed access could reduce liquidity risk but might disintermediate banks and affect monetary policy transmission. [Source: MIT DCI]
Stablecoins in Retail Payments (ArXiv)
ArXiv published a paper that systematically compares stablecoin-based payments with traditional card networks as retail payment systems. The authors introduce the CLEAR framework (Cost, Legality, Experience, Architecture, and Reach) to evaluate both systems across five dimensions. Their analysis reveals that while stablecoins offer advantages like continuous settlement, lower rail-level fees, and programmability, they suffer from significant drawbacks including weaker consumer protection (no native chargebacks), higher user-facing complexity (gas fees, wallet management), fragmented interoperability across blockchains, and limited merchant acceptance. Card networks, by contrast, subsidize consumers through interchange fees, provide strong legal recourse mechanisms, and benefit from standardized global infrastructure and network effects. The paper concludes that stablecoins demonstrate conditional advantages in closed-loop environments, cross-border corridors, and high-friction payment contexts (particularly in high-inflation economies), but remain structurally disadvantaged as general-purpose retail payment instruments compared to card networks due to their institutional incompleteness and lack of coordinated governance frameworks. [Source: ArXiv]
Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Sovereignty (CEPR)
The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) published an article that argues that a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is not essential for maintaining monetary sovereignty, contrary to popular claims. The author contends that throughout history, monetary stability has relied on a hybrid system of publicly defined units of account backed by private money (like bank deposits), rather than universal access to public currency. True monetary sovereignty depends on the central bank’s legal authority and its capacity to absorb risk through balance-sheet operations during crises, not on issuing retail digital currency. The article further distinguishes between money (the settlement asset) and payments (the transaction mechanism), arguing that concerns about foreign payment providers are payment system issues requiring regulatory solutions, not CBDC. [Source: CEPR]
Central Bank Digital Currency and Gresham’s Law: An Experimental Analysis (SNB)
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) published a paper that examines how people use central bank digital currency (CBDC) versus risky bank deposits through a laboratory experiment. The researchers tested Gresham’s law—the principle that “bad money drives out good”—by having participants allocate funds between a risk-free account (like CBDC) and a risky account (like bank deposits) that could lose 50% with 10% probability. Key findings show that when the risk-free account is unrestricted, people extensively hold and pay with it. However, when limited by a ceiling or negative interest rate, people tend to hoard the risk-free money as a store of value while using risky money for payments—confirming Gresham’s law. The study concludes that mechanisms designed to limit CBDC holdings (necessary to protect the banking system) may undermine its effectiveness as a payment method, suggesting it may be better to build payment systems on existing bank deposits rather than CBDC. [Source: SNB]
Upcoming Speaking Engagements:
The Digital Euro Conference 2026 (Frankfurt, March 26) will explore the future of money with a focus on CBDCs, stablecoins, and commercial bank tokens. This hybrid event offers the perfect platform to understand the future of digital money! [Register here and get 20% off the regular ticket price by using the Kiffmeister20 code!]

I produce a monthly digest of digital fiat currency (DFC) developments exclusively for the official sector (e.g., central banks, ministries of finance and international financial institution (e.g., the BIS, IMF, OECD, World Bank)) plus academics and firms that are active in the DFC space (commercial banks, technology providers, consultants, etc.). (DFCs include central bank digital currency (CBDC), stablecoins and tokenized deposits.) It goes out via email on the first business day of every month, and if you’re interested in being on the mailing list, please email me at john@kiffmeister.com.











